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ARE EMPIRICISTS ASKING THE RIGHT 
QUESTIONS ABOUT JUDICIAL 
DECISIONMAKING? 
JACK KNIGHT† 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a conference organized around the general topic of 
measuring judges and justice. The mandate for the conference raises a 
number of interesting and challenging questions, of both a positive 
and normative nature, about judicial decisionmaking. The main 
theme throughout the conference is how social scientists’ empirical 
studies of the courts help to answer these questions. Regarding 
questions of “measuring judges,” the relevant focus is on the ways 
social scientists conceptualize, operationalize, and then explain 
judicial decisionmaking. Regarding questions of “measuring justice,” 
the relevant focus is on how these same studies might help to assess to 
what extent judges satisfy the normative requirements of their jobs. 
This latter set of concerns may be seen as one important way of 
measuring the quality of judicial decisionmaking, that is, assessing 
how well judges do their jobs. At the outset, I think that it is 
important to note that underlying this conference is an assumption 
that I am quite comfortable making—that our positive explanations 
of judicial decisionmaking ought to significantly inform the normative 
assessments we make about the quality of this decisionmaking. 
In early conversations with some of my new colleagues at Duke, 
I found a recurring theme that evidenced some skepticism about the 
ability of social scientific studies of the courts to adequately inform 
debates about what judges do and how well they do it. The crux of the 
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skepticism seems to rest, in large part, on the question of whether 
empirical studies of the courts accurately capture the main concerns 
and primary activities of judges. 
In The Choices Justices Make1 Professor Lee Epstein and I 
specifically addressed the question of whether or not social science 
accounts of the courts accurately model and thus explain the primary 
elements of judicial decisionmaking.2 There we set out an account of 
the Supreme Court as a group of nine judges who make strategic 
decisions that are motivated by a wide range of preferences, values, 
and commitments. Their strategic decisions are defended and justified 
by an array of normative and legal sources, and are proffered within a 
complex institutional context. We defended what has since become 
the widely held view (at least in the social sciences) that the Justices 
often make new law and, in fact, do so consciously and intentionally. 
We argued that the Justices are fundamentally concerned about 
influencing the substantive content of legal rules and standards.3 One 
important implication of this argument is that the task of explicating 
the influential role of the Justices is a necessary feature of any 
adequate explanation of the evolution of the law in a democratic 
society like the United States. 
Professor Epstein and I argued at the time that this conception of 
the role of the Court had important implications for how social 
scientists studied judicial decisionmaking. More specifically, we 
argued that empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking had focused 
too narrowly on the disposition of the case, on the final vote on the 
merits: “a lesson—if not the lesson—of this volume is that 
explorations of the Supreme Court should not begin and end with 
examinations of the vote, as they have for so many years. Rather, we 
must explore the range of choices that contribute to the development 
of law.”4 We recommended that the focus be on a more general 
examination of the various mechanisms by which the Justices affect 
the development of the law: 
What it suggests is that research building on Choices should attempt 
to explain discrete choices, but that we would be disappointed if that 
is all our work generated—studies designed to explain the decision 
to accommodate or bargain or to persuade or to vote in a particular 
 
 1. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 2. Id. at 184–86. 
 3. Id. at 11–12, 22–55. 
 4. Id. at 185. 
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way and so on. We hope that future scholarship does not lose sight 
of the ultimate goal: to understand how these choices come together 
to explain the substantive content of law.5 
And central to this more general examination would be a 
broader conception of the elements of judicial choice—dispositional 
votes, for sure, but also those aspects of the opinions accompanying 
the votes, the arguments in support of their votes that communicated 
what the Justices themselves intended the substantive implications of 
their decisions to be in the future. For, on the strategic account that 
we offered, these opinions are seen to have a significant effect on the 
evolution of the law.6 
In this Article I use the recommendations that Professor Epstein 
and I set out in The Choices Justices Make as a starting point for a 
consideration of how well empirical studies of the courts address the 
issues of explanation and assessment raised by this conference. In 
doing so, I will propose ways in which future empirical research can 
be improved to better explain the dynamics of judicial 
decisionmaking. Specifically, I emphasize the central importance of 
judicial opinions for such explanations, a task that has been 
underappreciated and thus underdeveloped in the empirical 
literature. The task of crafting persuasive opinions plays a central role 
in two aspects of the decisionmaking process: the justification of the 
legitimacy of the decision and the establishment of new law. 
First, I review the literature in the last ten years to see what 
questions social scientists are asking and to see what they take to be 
the important elements of judicial decisionmaking. Second, I offer a 
descriptive account of the practice of judicial decisionmaking. Third, I 
assess how well the present state of the literature captures this 
plausible conception of what judges actually do, a conception that is 
quite compatible with a strategic approach to judicial decisionmaking. 
Fourth, I reconsider our earlier recommendation by assessing the 
implications of the different ways of conceptualizing, 
operationalizing, measuring, and assessing judicial decisions. 
This last task returns directly to the main themes of the 
conference. On the one hand, I assess the positive implications for 
social scientific explanations, focusing on the effects of different 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. at 95–107 (discussing examples of strategic opinion writing); id. at 167–77 
(examining the use of precedent in published opinions). 
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conceptual and measurement choices on how well we can explain 
what judges actually do. On the other hand, I consider the normative 
implications for assessments of the quality of judicial decisionmaking 
and for recommendations for judicial reforms. 
I.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LITERATURE 
 Social scientists who study the courts employ an impressive array 
of statistical and mathematical approaches. This array has grown in 
variety and sophistication in the last decade. Although there are some 
scholars who employ the full range of approaches, most students of 
the courts focus primarily on one of two main approaches, employing 
either quantitative (statistical models with empirical data)7 or formal 
theoretic (mathematical models) studies of judicial behavior.8 One of 
the most striking features of this research is the way formal and 
empirical scholars have moved in different directions in terms of how 
they conceptualize judicial choice. 
Empirical social scientists have been at the forefront of the study 
of judicial decisionmaking from the earliest days of this line of 
research. They engaged in the initial, and perhaps field-defining, 
debate in the literature: what causes, and thus explains, the most basic 
element of judicial decisionmaking—the vote on the merits? This was 
the classic conflict between the legal and attitudinal models. Put 
simply, under the legal model, judges make decisions based on what 
precedent dictated, whereas under the attitudinal model, judges’ 
decisions are based on their own ideology, preferences, or values. 
From the perspective of the social scientists, the research strategy was 
to demonstrate that judicial decisions (1) could not be explained by 
precedent (in the sense that they were inconsistent with the dictates 
of precedent) and (2) were therefore better explained by the judge’s 
personal values or preferences (in the sense that the direction of the 
judicial decision was highly correlated with some measure of judicial 
ideology).9 For the purposes of this analysis, the social scientists 
focused on the disposition of the case, the vote on the merits, as the 
 
 7. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological 
Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 
378–84 (2008). 
 8. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment 
on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 280–92 (2007). 
 9. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 110–14 (2002). 
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relevant dependent variable. And for the purposes of assessing the 
attitudinal challenge to the legal model, the focus on votes was 
adequate to the task. It provided an important metric for measuring 
whether, and to what extent, judicial decisions were consistent with 
the legal model. Early research in the judicial politics field extended 
the analysis of the relative merits of the legal and attitudinal 
explanations of judicial decisions.10 
The range of questions that form the basis of empirical studies of 
the courts dating back to the early debates is wide and impressive. 
Many studies have focused on other aspects of the judicial process. 
Topics such as agenda setting, the influence of amicus curiae briefs 
and oral argument, and the dynamics of collegial courts have received 
sustained attention by scholars.11 Another important area of study has 
been the relationship between courts and other political actors. Some 
of the most interesting work has analyzed the influence of other 
actors on judicial choice, including both the other branches of 
government in the separation-of-powers framework and the public at 
large through the power of public opinion.12 Many of these same 
topics remain on the agenda of empirical scholars. 
Here it is important to note that, to the extent that judicial 
decisionmaking remains an important element of these various 
analyses, judicial choice is normally conceptualized as the 
dispositional vote. Thus, it is not surprising that considerable effort is 
still invested in measures and methods that seek to refine both 
measures of judicial ideology and case disposition. A 2006 analysis of 
 
 10. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL 
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 5–7 (1992); see also Saul Brenner & Marc 
Stier, Retesting Segal and Spaeth’s Stare Decisis Model, 40 AM J. POL. SCI. 1036, 1039 (1996) 
(criticizing the Segal and Spaeth model concerning precedent and the role of stare decisis in 
judicial decisionmaking); Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The 
Impact of Justices’ Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM J. POL. SCI. 1049, 1050 
(1996) (same). 
 11. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda 
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1110 (1988); Paul M. Collins Jr., 
Lobbyists Before the U.S. Supreme Court: Investigating the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 60 
POL. RES. Q. 55, 55 (2007); Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The 
Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 99 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 617 (1991); Charles H. 
Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public 
Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 751 (1989); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. 
Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court 
Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1018 (2004). 
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tax law by Professors Epstein, Staudt and Wiedenbeck exemplifies 
the direction, as well as the sophistication, of this work.13 In that 
article, the authors revisit the basic question of precedent versus 
preferences, but do so in the previously underanalyzed area of U.S. 
tax law. Most of the studies about the relative merits of the legal and 
attitudinal models were conducted using data sets drawn from the 
areas of constitutional law. One of the important contributions of the 
Epstein, Staudt and Wiedenbeck paper is that it moves the 
foundational debate to the area of economic activity, an area in which 
many have argued that judicial ideology will have a less important 
role to play in determining judicial choice.14 In the course of their 
analysis, they demonstrate the complexity of the problem of 
discerning the effects of precedent and politics in this area of the law 
and propose some inventive methods for distinguishing the differing 
effects for different types of economic activities.15 They conclude, 
contrary to common intuition, that ideology does play a role in 
explaining decisions (judgment for either the government or the 
taxpayer) in certain types of cases.16 
This article is an exemplar of how a rich empirical analysis can 
continue to push the boundaries of our understanding of judicial 
decisionmaking while focusing on the dispositional vote. Compare 
this approach with the direction that formal theoretic research has 
gone in the last decade. Formal theorists who study the courts initially 
borrowed their analytical models from the research on legislative 
bodies. The models were standard spatial models that sought to 
analyze legislative votes as a function of the ideological distance 
between a legislator’s ideal preference point and the utility point of 
the proposed piece of legislation under consideration. On this 
analysis, legislators voted for the alternatives that minimized the 
difference between their ideal preference points and the utility value 
of the alternatives. Early formal theoretic accounts of collegial courts 
basically imposed the spatial model framework on the U.S. Supreme 
Court and analyzed the dynamic of decisionmaking in terms of 
minimizing the policy differences between case outcomes and the 
 
 13. Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological Component of 
Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1815–20 (2006). 
 14. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice and “Boring” Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 
401, 406 (2001); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory 
Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 351 (2001). 
 15. Staudt et al., supra note 13, at 1815–21. 
 16. Id. at 1821. 
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ideal points of the Justices.17 In these early studies judicial choices 
were operationalized, not as dispositional votes, but rather as 
measures of the substantive policy consequences of the decisions. 
This approach is still employed in a significant number of game 
theoretic analyses of the courts. 
Some studies by formal theorists have refined the spatial models 
they employ to better characterize what they take to be the distinctive 
nature of judicial decisionmaking. A line of research that best 
exemplifies these changes builds on the early work of Professor 
Kornhauser and others.18 The authors of these studies employ what 
they call a “case-space” approach to judicial decisionmaking. Here is 
how Professors Lax and Cameron characterized the approach: 
Judicial decision making has unique characteristics that distinguish it 
from decision making in legislative settings. In particular, judges 
resolve legal disputes; that is, they decide cases, which present 
themselves as bundles of facts (fact patterns). Depending on the 
facts presented in the case, the judge determines the case’s 
disposition (typically a dichotomous judgment) according to a rule. 
When appellate courts address judicial policy, they typically do so in 
opinions that modify existing legal rules or create new ones, perhaps 
to accommodate new factual situations. Thus, judge-created rules 
embody the content of judicial policy, and bargaining over judicial 
policy on collegial courts typically involves bargaining over the 
content of legal rules.19  
They use this analytical framework to explain judicial decisions 
primarily as a function of the effect that their decision will have on 
the content of the rule that will be established and, secondarily as a 
function of the effect on the disposition of the case. In doing so, the 
 
 17. For a review of this literature, see THOMAS H. HAMMOND, CHRIS W. BONNEAU & 
REGINALD S. SHEEHAN, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT 6 (2005). 
 18. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US 
Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 421, 423 (2007) (considering the relationship between 
the rulings of circuit court panels and the Supreme Court in gauging compliance with legal 
rules); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
441, 467 (1992) (concluding that issue-by-issue adjudication, rather than case-by-case 
adjudication, requires judges to respect the doctrinal choice they made in prior cases); Lax & 
Cameron, supra note 8, at 277 (examining how judges’ crafting of legal opinions relates to their 
policy and doctrinal goals); Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer, Where is the Sin in Sincere? 
Sophisticated Manipulation of Sincere Judicial Voters (With Applications to Other Voting 
Environments), 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 34–35 (1995) (finding that judges write opinions partly 
anticipating the reactions of the other governmental branches). 
 19. Lax & Cameron, supra note 8, at 280 (footnote omitted). 
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formal theoretic scholars conceptualize the judicial choice as a 
decision about the substantive content of the opinion that 
accompanies, and justifies, the disposition of the case. 
The difference in how the two approaches conceptualize the 
object of judicial decisionmaking is that empiricists emphasize 
disposition whereas formal theorists emphasize the substantive 
content of the rule that emerges from the opinion. Although I 
acknowledge that such stark distinctions are always open to the 
challenge of an exception, I think that this claim does a good job of 
capturing the general state of the literature. So, why the difference? 
This disagreement may have a number of sources. First, this may be a 
basic disagreement about what judges actually do. Second, this may 
be merely a disagreement about emphasis, about what is most 
important about what judges do. Third, it may be a disagreement 
about what social scientists can best explain about judicial 
decisionmaking. 
The first two possible sources of difference should be amenable 
to comparison with a plausible account of the actual practice of 
judicial decisionmaking. I will take this up in Part II. Setting out this 
plausible account enables me to discuss the question of whether the 
difference in emphasis on votes or substantive opinions really matters 
and, if so, how much and for what kinds of questions and concerns. 
The third potential source of disagreement cannot be resolved by 
reference to an account of judicial practice. Rather, it is a 
disagreement about what is in the realm of what social scientists can 
do and do well, and what is part of the comparative advantage of the 
social scientist. The formal theoretic emphasis on the substantive 
content of the rule seeks to capture an important aspect of what 
Professor Epstein and I recommended in Choices. But the attention 
to substantive content has remained almost completely at the level of 
theory. To my knowledge there have not been any serious efforts to 
translate the results of the case-space analyses into an empirically 
meaningful research agenda. I will return to this point when I 
consider what social scientists can do in this regard. It is equally 
important, however, that in the last few years the overwhelming 
majority of empiricists have not incorporated other elements of 
judicial reasoning and substantive argumentation into their analyses 
in a systematic way. 
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II.  THE PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
What do judges actually do? What are the important elements of 
the process of making a decision in a case? And what are the 
resources that judges use in the process of making those decisions? 
These are very complicated questions that warrant a much longer and 
detailed discussion than I can offer here. But it would be helpful to 
have a general sketch of the practice of judicial decisionmaking as a 
comparative referent for answering questions about the quality of 
social scientific research on the courts. Such a referent would allow 
making some kind of informed assessment about how well the 
existing research conceptualizes judicial decisionmaking and how well 
it identifies the important elements of the decisionmaking process. 
Judge Richard Posner20 offers an account of judicial 
decisionmaking that is appropriate to my purposes here. This account 
is not uncontroversial for it challenges some of the common 
understandings offered by many other judges as to what motivates 
them and how they go about arriving at their decisions. And at the 
same time, it resists aligning too closely with any of the number of 
theoretical models in both the social sciences and jurisprudential 
literature that purport to set out the answer to the question of what 
determines judicial choice. 
It offers, instead, a general framework for conceptualizing the 
task of judicial decisionmaking that I think is helpful for analyzing the 
practice of courts even if one rejects the more substantive claims that 
Judge Posner makes about the pragmatic nature of judicial choice. By 
this, I mean the following. The framework I present identifies 
categories of factors that one must account for when describing and 
explaining what judges do. Judge Posner’s account identifies three 
categories that are especially relevant to the discussions at this 
conference: (1) the causal factors that influence the judge’s decision, 
(2) the reasoning process by which the decision is made, and (3) the 
relevance of the judicial opinion. 
Particular accounts of what judges do and thus particular 
explanations of judicial decisionmaking will offer different and often 
competing ways of thinking about the relevance of these factors. For 
example, proponents of the traditional legal model can define the 
substantive content of the framework in such a way as to develop an 
account of judges who are motivated by precedent and who craft 
 
 20. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
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opinions that are grounded in past decisions. On the other hand, 
committed advocates of the attitudinal model can focus on judges 
who are motivated by ideological values and policy preferences and 
who pay less attention to the precedential value of their opinions. 
More importantly, for people who believe (as Judge Posner does and 
as I think most social scientists who study the courts really do) that 
the process of judicial decisionmaking is best characterized as a 
complicated mix of factors identified by several competing theories, 
the framework should allow the accommodation of this complexity 
and, perhaps, the distinguishing of the conditions under which 
different theories of decisionmaking apply. 
A. The Causal Factors that Influence the Judge’s Decision 
Consider first the way in which Judge Posner conceptualizes the 
factors that might influence a judge’s decision. On one dimension, this 
is a question of judicial motivation—what is the underlying basis of 
judges’ decisions? This is the basic question that generates the debate 
over the relative importance of precedent and preferences. On 
another dimension, this is a more general question about the various 
sources that a judge may rely upon in arriving at a decision. 
Judge Posner adopts a broad conception of these factors in his 
discussion of what might appropriately be characterized as the “law” 
on which judges base their decisions: 
The true middle ground, as long ago explained by Roscoe Pound, is 
a tripartite conception of law as legal doctrines (rules and 
standards), techniques for deriving and applying doctrines 
(techniques such as stare decisis—decision according to precedent—
which often means distinguishing or overruling a precedent), and 
social and ethical (in a word, policy) views.21  
He elaborates on this point: 
“Law” in a judicial setting is simply the material, in the broadest 
sense, out of which judges fashion their decisions. Because the 
materials of legalist decision making fail to generate acceptable 
answers to all the legal questions that American judges are required 
to decide, judges perforce have occasional—indeed rather 
frequent—recourse to other sources of judgment, including their 
own political opinions or policy judgments, even their idiosyncrasies. 
 
 21. Id. at 43. 
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As a result, law is shot through with politics and with much else 
besides that does not fit the legalist model of decision making.22 
This highlights one important set of factors that should enter into 
a social scientific study of courts: the causal factors, including 
motivation, that influence the judge’s choice. 
B. The Reasoning Process by which the Decision Is Made 
Second, consider Judge Posner’s conception of the process of 
judicial reasoning through which the various causal factors are 
weighed to produce the decision. Judge Posner begins by rejecting a 
strict adherence to the legalist model: “It might seem that judges 
would legislate only after they had tried and failed to decide a case by 
reference to the orthodox materials of legislative text and precedent. 
Some judges do proceed in that way. But others reverse the 
sequence.”23 Judge Posner argues that some are motivated primarily 
by policy concerns: 
They start by making the legislative judgment, that is, by asking 
themselves what outcome—not just who wins and who loses, but 
what rule or standard or principle enunciated in their judicial 
opinion—would have the best consequences. Only then do they 
consider whether that outcome is blocked by the orthodox materials 
of legal decision-making, or, more precisely, whether the benefits of 
that outcome are offset by the costs that it would impose in 
impairing legalist values such as legal stability.24 
He acknowledges that others are, in fact, motivated by the pursuit of 
precedent: 
An equally pragmatic judge might start the other way around, by 
asking himself whether the issue in the case was ruled by statutory 
language, precedent, or some other orthodox source of law that it 
would be a mistake to disregard. The lawyers in the case would have 
hurled at him general statements, drawn from cases and statutes, 
that covered the case as a matter of semantics. But he would want to 
determine whether the authors of those statements had been 
referring to the kind of issue confronting him in this case. If not, he 
would have to make a legislative judgment.25 
 
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. Id. at 84. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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Nonetheless, Judge Posner argues that circumstances beyond the 
control of any particular judge (the inevitable uncertainty and 
ambiguity in the existing law and the necessity, in most cases, of 
having to render a decision) forces judges, in the end, to balance a 
variety of factors in the course of their reasoning: 
Most judges blend the two inquiries, the legalist and the legislative, 
rather than addressing them in sequence. Their response to a case is 
generated by legal doctrine, institutional constraints, policy 
preferences, strategic considerations, and the equities of the case, all 
mixed together and all mediated by temperament, experience, 
ambition, and other personal factors. A judge does not reach a point 
in a difficult case at which he says, “The law has run out and now I 
must do some legislating.” He knows that he has to decide and that 
whatever he does decide will (within the broadest of limits) be law; 
for the judge as occasional legislator is still a judge.26 
This highlights a second set of factors that should reasonably enter 
into a social scientific study of courts: the ways in which judges 
balance the various causal factors and, if possible, the conditions 
under which one or another set of factors might control. 
C. The Relevance of the Judicial Opinion 
Third, Judge Posner emphasizes that the practice of judicial 
decisionmaking, as defined by the institutional structure of most legal 
systems, dictates that judges subsequently explain and justify their 
decisions through some kind of publicly articulated opinion.27 There 
are a number of important points introduced by the requirement of 
an opinion, relevant to my present discussion, that need to be 
highlighted. First, the judge’s opinion may be unrelated to the actual 
factors that were influential in deciding the case. Judge Posner 
discusses this in terms of the unconscious nature of many decisions, 
but his point is equally relevant to the other types of factors (for 
example, the intentional priority of policy over precedent) that may 
weigh heavily in a judge’s actual decision: 
The role of the unconscious in judicial decision making is obscured 
by the convention that requires a judge to explain his decision in an 
opinion. The judicial opinion can best be understood as an attempt 
to explain how the decision, even if (as is most likely) arrived at on 
 
 26. Id. at 84–85. 
 27. Id. at 110–11. 
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the basis of intuition, could have been arrived at on the basis of 
logical, step-by-step reasoning. That is a check on the errors to 
which intuitive reasoning is prone because of its compressed, 
inarticulate character . . . .28 
Second, the opinion is commonly produced after a decision on 
the vote on the merits: 
It is an imperfect check, however, because the vote on how the case 
shall be decided precedes the opinion; and though it might be 
otherwise, most judges do not treat a vote, though nominally 
tentative, as a hypothesis to be tested by the further research 
conducted at the opinion-writing stage. That research is mainly a 
search for supporting arguments and evidence.29 
Third, Judge Posner emphasizes the important way in which the 
opinion itself affects the substantive content of the law: 
The first decision in a line of cases may be the product of 
inarticulable emotion or hunch. But once it is given articulate form, 
that form will take on a life of its own—a valuable life that may 
include binding the author and the other judges of his court (along 
with lower-court judges) and thus imparting needed stability to law 
through the doctrine of precedent, though a death grip if judges 
ignore changed circumstances that make a decision no longer a 
sound guide. Opinions create, extend, and fine-tune rules; they are 
supplements to constitutional and other legislative rules.30 
Fourth, the offering of the opinion has an important justificatory 
function. Through the practice of offering an opinion, judges seek to 
enhance the legitimacy of the decision in particular and the judicial 
system in general. Judge Posner puts this last point in terms of the 
extent to which the judge’s decision on the merits and the 
accompanying opinion conforms to what is commonly accepted in the 
community as the “law”: “But since it is a public document, it can be 
scrutinized for conformity to the norms of the judicial process, and in 
particular for the degree to which it gives legalism its due.”31 This last 
claim, however, should not be taken as an acceptance on Judge 
Posner’s part of the commonly held view that judicial legitimacy is a 
function of narrow conformity to legal precedent. To the contrary, he 
 
 28. Id. at 110 (footnote omitted). 
 29. Id. at 110–11. 
 30. Id. at 111. 
 31. Id. 
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casts the net of judicial legitimacy more broadly than it is often 
depicted: 
when we say that a judge’s decisions are in conformity with “the 
law,” we do not mean that we can put his decisions next to 
something called “law” and see whether they are the same. We 
mean that the determinants of the decisions were things that it is 
lawful for judges to take into account consciously or unconsciously. 
A judge is not acting lawlessly unless there is no authorized method 
by which he could deny some claim that a litigant was urging on him, 
yet he denied it nevertheless.32 
In emphasizing the importance of opinion writing as a 
justificatory practice and thus a potentially necessary element of 
explanations of judicial decisionmaking, one need not address the 
question of what makes any particular determinant of a judicial 
decision lawful or legitimate. For my purposes here it is enough to 
acknowledge that there are, as Judge Posner suggests, social 
processes that give various factors, various sources of law, legitimacy 
in the eyes of the relevant community and thus make them lawful for 
purposes of judicial decisionmaking. The most straightforward 
example is judicial precedent and the legitimate ways in which it can 
be established. Another category would be constitutional and 
statutory enactments. Focusing on informal norms and social values, 
instead of the more traditional factors, will cause more controversy 
about their legitimacy. In principle, however, the controversy should 
be subject to resolution through factual investigation, that is, does a 
legal community accept a particular norm or value as legitimate for 
these purposes? If so, then the factor has a certain normative 
legitimacy for the purpose of judicial decisionmaking. If not, then the 
influence of the factor on judicial choice will be deemed illegitimate 
and, in Judge Posner’s words, unlawful. Questions such as these are 
relevant for normative assessments of the quality of judicial 
decisionmaking, a topic I discuss in Part III. 
This discussion highlights a third set of factors that should enter 
into a social scientific study of courts: the reasons, arguments, and 
justifications judges offer in their opinions. These factors determine 
both the substantive content of the law and the normative legitimacy 
of their decisions. 
 
 32. Id. at 44. 
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III.  HOW WELL ARE EMPIRICISTS DOING? 
Of the three sets of factors that are highlighted by this sketch of 
judicial decisionmaking, empirical social scientists have focused their 
attention on the first two: the causal factors that determine choice and 
the underlying reasoning of those decisions. The classic debate 
between the legal and the attitudinal models is at the center of the 
ongoing debate about the determinants of judicial choice. That is 
primarily a debate about the basic motivations of judges. To assess 
the relative importance of various factors that might affect judges 
who are motivated by ideology, empirical social scientists have 
engaged in detailed analyses of judicial reasoning, detailed at least to 
the extent that the analyses involves a balancing of factors that might 
affect the choice calculus. Empiricists have primarily conducted these 
analyses by focusing on the disposition of the case, the vote on the 
merits.33 In doing so, they have developed several ways of 
characterizing the vote (including measures of the ideological 
direction of the vote). Here it is interesting that those law professors 
who have adopted social scientific approaches to study judicial 
decisionmaking have also adopted the vote on the merits as their 
primary dependent variable. 
Empirical research can be contrasted with the work of formal 
theoretic scholars who have focused primarily on the issues of judicial 
reasoning (especially on collegial courts) and on the creation of 
judicial opinions (most recently through the case-space framework). 
Formal theorists have primarily dealt with the central issue of judicial 
motivation by assumption, relying on the work of empirical scholars 
finding that judges are motivated by policy concerns. They have 
employed models that emphasize the substantive content of the 
opinions rather than the dispositional vote. Although they have 
contended that their work has important implications for empirical 
studies of the courts,34 they have offered few, if any, insights as to 
exactly how the formal results would translate into empirical research 
on issues such as the crafting of opinions. 
Upon reflection, there has been little uptake from empirical 
scholars of the specific recommendation that Epstein and I made to 
expand the focus of their analysis to those causal mechanisms that 
influence the substantive content of the law. Other scholars have 
 
 33. E.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 255–60. 
 34. E.g., Lax & Cameron, supra note 8, at 296–97. 
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noted a similar disregard of the importance of judicial opinions.35 And 
some empiricists have begun to push research in the direction of 
taking the substance of judicial opinion seriously.36 But these efforts, 
although significant and important, are few in number and they do 
not begin to constitute a systematic move in the direction of a new 
focus in the study of judicial decisionmaking. 
So, to what extent does this really matter? To what extent does it 
matter that empirical social scientists have generally focused on the 
votes on the merits and not on the task of crafting of judicial 
opinions? In addressing this question, I want to distinguish three 
separate tasks that are relevant to the concerns of this conference. 
First, to what extent does it matter for the task of description, for 
offering a realistic descriptive account of what judges do? Second, to 
what extent does it matter for the task of explanation, for offering a 
persuasive explanation of what judges do? And, third, to what extent 
does it matter for the normative task of assessing the quality of 
judicial decisionmaking, for assessing how well judges do their jobs? 
Let me take these up in turn. Regarding the task of description, I 
can be brief. Attention to the crafting of opinions is a very important 
element of an adequate description of the practice of judicial 
decisionmaking. But this is not really a problem for social scientists, 
even those who are exclusively empirical scholars, because descriptive 
accuracy is not a criterion by which social scientific research will, or 
should, be judged. The only concerns there would be about the 
descriptive accuracy of a social scientific account of judicial 
decisionmaking would be the possible implications of that accuracy 
for the tasks of explanation and normative assessment. 
In regard to the task of explanation, the implications of focusing 
on votes and not opinions are a function of the specific question being 
answered. For example, the question “does X affect judicial 
decisionmaking?” is a basic question about causal effect. The classic 
 
 35. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262 (2006); Anna 
Harvey, What Makes a Judgment “Liberal”? Coding Bias in the United States Supreme Court 
Judicial Database 27–28 (June 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 36. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Cory Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 
2009) (manuscript at 3–4, on file with the Duke Law Journal); Kevin T. McGuire et al., 
Measuring Policy Content on the U.S. Supreme Court, J. POL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3, on 
file with the Duke Law Journal); Tom S. Clark & Benjamin Lauderdale, Locating Supreme 
Court Opinions in Doctrine Space 1 (Sept. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
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example of this is the question of whether judges’ ideologies or policy 
preferences affect their decisions. Similar studies have analyzed the 
causal effect of a variety of additional factors (for example, amicus 
curiae briefs, oral argument, other governmental actors, and public 
opinion).37 These are the types of effects that are important to know 
about when making a prediction about the outcomes of future cases. 
For these types of questions, causal effect is primarily a yes or no 
issue and the dispositional vote is an adequate measure of judicial 
choice. The value of this measure has been demonstrated repeatedly 
in the debate between legalists and realists, as the overly simplistic 
conception of the causal role of precedent endorsed by the legalist 
model has been consistently undermined.38 
Conversely, the question “which factor, X or Y, has a more 
significant effect on judicial decisionmaking?” is about the relative 
importance of the factors that might affect judicial choice. This is the 
type of question to ask when attempting to explain the balancing of 
factors that is entailed by the sketch of judicial reasoning. Here again 
are basic questions of causal effect. And again the dispositional vote 
is a reasonably good measure for purposes of answering these kinds 
of questions.39 
On the other hand, answering the question “how does X affect 
judicial decisionmaking?” is a task of identifying and specifying causal 
mechanisms. Consider, for example, the question of how past 
precedent affects judicial decisionmaking. One approach to this 
question follows from the traditional legal model: assume that judges 
are motivated to answer legal questions according to precedent and 
then analyze the way past precedent determines their choices in 
particular cases. An alternative approach comes out of the strategic 
model of judicial decisionmaking.40 From my perspective it offers a 
 
 37. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 38. See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and 
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1150, 1154–55 (2004). 
 39. There is one problem, however, with relying on the dispositional vote in such cases. It is 
the problem of behavioral equivalence. This occurs when both variables under consideration 
would predict the same decision on the merits. In such situations it is impossible to discern 
which factor, if either, is exerting causal influence. The lack of a more finely grained measure of 
the judicial decision tends to result in the underestimation of the causal force of one of the 
variables. To the extent that this is a problem, it will offer further support for my argument that 
empiricists should focus greater attention on the substantive content of judicial opinions. 
 40. For an extended discussion of the strategic approach, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra 
note 1, at 1–21. 
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much more plausible account of the way in which precedent affects 
the choices judges make. 
This approach can be formulated in a number of different ways, 
depending on what the primary motivation of judges is assumed to be. 
In the limiting case judges are motivated totally by ideology; moving 
away from the limiting case, judges are motivated by some mix of 
factors, including ideology and concern about precedent. On the 
strategic account, the primary focus of the analysis would be on the 
ways in which precedent can affect the choices of policy-motivated 
judges. In Choices, Professor Epstein and I argued that past 
precedent could serve as a causal constraint on the decisions of such 
judges.41 The logic of the constraint follows from the fact that judges 
are required to give a public justification, through opinion, of their 
decision. To the extent that past precedent is one of the factors that 
judges might invoke to lend legitimacy to their decisions, it can serve 
as a constraint on their discretion. The same causal logic can hold for 
any of the other factors that judges might employ in crafting their 
opinions. 
An appropriate measure of judicial choice is necessary to test 
this argument, and thus to see if the “precedent as constraint” 
mechanism offers a satisfactory answer to the “how” question. For 
this type of question, the disposition of the case is an inadequate 
measure of the judicial decision. A more nuanced measure of the 
range of alternatives in the feasible choice set of a judge—that is, a 
measure of the substantive content of the law produced by the case—
is necessary to adequately explain how causal mechanisms work. To 
see why this is the case, consider the following characterization of the 
judge’s choice calculus. Analytically, it is possible to conceptualize the 
judge’s decision problem in the spatial terms commonly employed by 
formal theorists. The spatial conception captures the more intuitive 
idea that the task of judges is to render justifiable decisions that 
produce outcomes as close as possible to the judge’s ideal decision. In 
an unconstrained environment, the judge would render decisions that 
produce the judge’s most preferred outcomes. In most circumstances, 
however, the judge’s choice will be constrained by the requirements 
of justification. Therefore, there should be some distance between the 
judge’s unconstrained, preferred choice and the choice that the judge 
actually makes in the case. That difference is an indicator of the 
causal effect induced by the requirements of justification. 
 
 41. Id. at 40–45, 163–65. 
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To ascertain the effect of precedent it is necessary to identify 
some distance between what the outcome produced by the 
unconstrained choice would have been and the outcome produced by 
the publicly justifiable decision. If there is some significant distance 
between the two, and if the judges justify their decisions in terms of 
past precedent, then it is reasonable to conclude that the precedent 
had a constraining effect on judicial choice. Setting the particulars 
aside, the basic point here is that the analysis of how factors actually 
affect decisions will require in most cases a more refined measure of 
the feasible set of alternatives available to a judge than will be 
provided by the vote on the merits. Some measure of the substantive 
content of the law would satisfy this requirement. The one exception 
to this conclusion would be when there are very few alternatives in 
the judge’s choice set. In such an instance, the vote on the merits 
might be an adequate proxy for the substantive outcome of the case. 
For the social scientist, the problem is that the analyst is unlikely to 
know about the dearth of alternatives in the feasible set without 
conducting a more detailed analysis of the available alternatives. 
And finally, answering questions about the effects of X on either 
the substantive content of the law or on the justification of the 
decision involves an explicit analysis of the form and content of the 
judicial opinion. A narrow focus on disposition will not provide the 
data necessary for an adequate explanation of these issues. 
In regard to the normative task of assessing the quality of judicial 
decisionmaking, the implications of an exclusive focus on the 
dispositional vote will depend on the criterion of assessment. If the 
relevant normative criterion were one of strict prohibition, “X is not a 
legitimate determinant of judicial decisionmaking,” then the basic 
causal explanations derived from analyses of the first two kinds of 
questions would be sufficient for judicial assessment. Thus, focusing 
on the vote on the merits would be appropriate. The types of 
behavior covered by such prohibitions, such as explicit prohibitions of 
judicial corruption, however, likely constitute a very small percentage 
of the types of judicial activity we will want to cover in our 
assessments. 
Adequate measures of judicial behavior are needed to extend 
these assessments to more general questions of judicial quality. And, 
from a normative perspective, this raises the basic question: measures 
of what? The account of judicial decisionmaking that I draw out of 
Judge Posner’s work has a very important answer to this question, an 
answer that ties assessments of judicial quality to basic questions of 
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judicial legitimacy. And this account has the added benefit of 
shedding considerable light on the contribution that social scientists 
might be able to make to such an assessment. 
On this account, the publicly articulated nature of the judicial 
opinion is the key element to determining the legitimacy of judicial 
decisionmaking. The extent to which the judges can justify their 
decisions in terms of reasons deemed legitimate by the relevant 
community, the more legitimate both the decision and the 
accompanying change in the subsequent content of the law will be. 
And, furthermore, the central importance of the opinion for the 
public justification of the decision is, in principle, independent of any 
motivations or other factors that influenced the initial decision itself. 
This last point is at the very least implied by Judge Posner’s account. 
It is made explicit in a compatible account offered by Professor 
H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law.42 
On my reading of their work, although they differ in many ways, 
Judge Posner and Professor Hart share an understanding of the 
institutional nature of the practice of judicial decisionmaking. Both 
envision the task of decisionmaking as one that involves discretion 
constrained by the rules and conventions of the legal system. 
Professor Hart, in his emphasis on the central role of rules of 
recognition, grounds the very legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking in 
the institutional dictates of the system itself.43 Although he adopts a 
more narrow conception of the dictates of the system, of the factors 
rendered legitimate for judicial decisionmaking, than the one I sketch 
here, the basic point about the significant role of a justificatory 
opinion is apropos. On his account, the definition of the role of the 
courts, as well as the standards of legitimacy and effectiveness, are 
derived from what Professor Hart calls the rules of recognition, the 
set of secondary rules that dictate how the primary rules, the laws, are 
to be implemented, administered, and changed.44 The rules of 
recognition distribute authority over the different tasks involved in 
maintaining the legal system among various legal and political 
institutions. Within this distribution, the courts are primarily 
responsible for adjudicating controversies over how the law is to be 
applied in particular cases. Central to Professor Hart’s understanding 
of these rules of recognition is that they are effective as long as they 
 
 42. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 112 (1961). 
 43. Id. at 111–13, 132. 
 44. Id. at 91–92. 
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garner the voluntary acceptance of the members of the community.45 
In this way, Professor Hart ties effective institutional performance to 
shared views about the legitimacy of the various institutions. 
For Professor Hart, the court, more often than not in the form of 
unelected judges, derives its legitimacy from the particular nature of 
its most common form of decisionmaking, the application of primary 
rules to new fact situations. While acknowledging that there is always 
room for discretion in the application of rules, Professor Hart insists 
on the importance of rules even in such cases: “these activities . . . 
must not disguise the fact that both the framework within which they 
take place and their chief end-product is one of general rules. These 
are rules the application of which individuals can see for themselves 
in case after case, without further recourse to official direction or 
discretion.”46 
It is important to note that Professor Hart emphasizes the 
“framework” in which judges’ make their decisions, highlighting the 
importance of institutional procedures as a precondition for the 
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. Professor Hart’s justification of 
the court as an institution rests on the idea that judges make their 
decisions in an impartial way.47 The criteria of impartiality, when 
applied, serve to restrict the types of arguments that parties can 
effectively employ as well as the ways in which judges can justify their 
decisions. According to Professor Hart, in an ideal situation, an 
impartial judge will justify a decision in terms of predetermined 
rules.48 In response to the criticism that precedent citation is merely 
rhetoric to justify decisions made on other grounds, Professor Hart 
insists that 
[s]ome judicial decisions may be like this, but it is surely evident that 
for the most part decisions, like the chess-player’s moves, are 
reached either by genuine effort to conform to rules consciously 
taken as guiding standards of decision or, if intuitively reached, are 
justified by rules which the judge was antecedently disposed to 
observe and whose relevance to the case in hand would generally be 
acknowledged.49 
 
 45. Id. at 111–13. 
 46. Id. at 132–33. 
 47. Id. at 202–04. 
 48. Id. at 139–40. 
 49. Id. at 137. 
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Professor Hart’s institutional approach to legal legitimacy, as I 
understand it, reinforces the importance of the publicly articulated 
opinion to developing an understanding of what judges do. Part of the 
task of judges is to make their decisions as legitimate in the eyes of 
the relevant community as they can. On the account I set out here, it 
is not a task that requires them to adhere to any particular set of 
factors in the process of reasoning to their decision. And this task 
does not place any ex ante constraints (except the usual constraints 
on corrupt behavior) on the factors that influence their vote on the 
merits. Rather, it is a task that requires judges to give an ex post 
justification of their decision that is consistent with the criteria of 
legitimacy in their community. That is, judges can use whatever 
means and reasons they want to arrive at their decision, but they are 
compelled by the dictates of legitimacy to justify that decision with 
reasons generally accepted by the members of the community. This is 
an important insight, significantly relevant for assessing the quality of 
judicial decisionmaking. And it is not merely an artifact of Judge 
Posner’s broad, pragmatic conception of what judges do. This insight 
is an important feature of Professor Hart’s positivist account that is 
more closely aligned with the traditional legalist conception of 
judicial decisionmaking. 
The judicial opinion, on this account, becomes the primary focus 
of assessments of judicial quality. How well do judges justify their 
votes and their attempts to substantively alter the existing content of 
law? Although it may be desirable to assess the effective performance 
of judges on other dimensions (for example, efficiency in handling 
case load), the basic dimension of judicial legitimacy surely holds a 
certain pride of place. In a sense, it suggests a certain lexicographic 
ordering of dimensions of assessment: only if the criteria of legitimacy 
were normally satisfied would it be necessary to move on to other 
criteria of quality. 
This argument about justification and legitimacy provides 
theoretical support for using measures like citation indices and 
reversal rates to study how well judges do their jobs. Citations may be 
a measure of a good decision that offers a legitimate justification for 
future changes in the substantive content of law; a reversal may be 
seen as a judgment that the justification was not legitimate. The 
justification for using these measures does not rest on a legalist claim 
that citations and reversals are indicators of the “correctness” of the 
decision. Rather the use is justified as a measure of the ability of 
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judges to offer for their decisions legitimate reasons for which there is 
a social consensus in the legal community. 
Measures of citation and reversal are, in an important sense, 
indirect indicators of judges’ ability to justify their decisions. They are 
a long-term assessment of how other judges think that they have 
performed the primary task of their job. And citation counts will only 
pertain to a portion of the cases in any judge’s workload. What can be 
made of the significant number of cases that, for various reasons, are 
neither cited nor reversed? If the concern is assessing judicial quality 
in this way, then it would be ideal to have some direct measures of the 
quality of judicial justification. 
And this goes back to the role that empirical scholars might play 
in the assessment of judicial quality. The overlap between what 
empirical scholars study and what empirical scholars would need for 
an adequate assessment of judicial quality on this account is small at 
best. Social scientists have made their most significant contributions 
to the study of courts up to this point by focusing primarily on the 
causal factors that determine the disposition of the case. But the 
normative assessment of judicial quality is best served by an analysis 
of matters of judicial reasoning and justificatory practice and not by 
studies of judicial motivation. 
Nonetheless, there is, in principle, a good reason to believe that 
the overlap between the interests of social scientists and those who 
want to assess judicial decisionmaking could be much broader. This is 
because there should be a significant overlap between explanations of 
how judges affect the substantive content of the law and normative 
assessments of how judges justify their decisions. The data is 
primarily the same in both cases: the arguments and reasons that they 
employ in their decisions are factors that affect both substantive 
content and judgments of legitimacy.50 So, the argument for having 
empirical social scientists take up the recommendations that 
Professor Epstein and I made about a broader research focus on 
substantive content is reinforced by the requirements of normative 
assessment. But perhaps this is harder to do than we thought. 
 
 50. See, e.g., Dimitri Landa & Jeffrey R. Lax, Disagreements on Collegial Courts: A Case-
Space Approach, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 306 (2008). 
KNIGHT IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:09:34 PM 
1554 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1531 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Any adequate analysis of the crafting of judicial opinions would 
require at least two kinds of measurement: (1) a measure of the 
substantive content of the law and (2) measures of the sources of 
justification and, thus, of new law (the reasons and arguments that 
judges employ in their opinions). These are richer and more complex 
kinds of empirical evidence than commonly found in the data sets 
used in the study of courts. Is it reasonable to think that empirical 
scholars can produce measures sufficient to adequately characterize 
substantive content, and yet satisfy the requirements of explanation in 
the social sciences? 
In the end the answer to this question turns on what the goal of 
the social sciences is, a topic much too vast to undertake here. But 
one common feature of most accounts of social science explanation is 
enough to understand what is at stake. That feature is the criterion of 
generalization. Social scientists seek to identify generalizations in 
social behavior. One of the common requirements for an adequate 
social explanation is the identification of causal mechanisms that 
apply generally to specific social situations. Generalization is a 
necessary, but perhaps not sufficient (this depends on having more 
details about the particular theory of social explanation), condition of 
an adequate explanation in the social sciences. How, therefore, can 
the desire for generalization be reconciled with what appears to be 
the richly detailed nature of the substance of law and legal sources? 
This is the basic conceptual and methodological question that needs 
to be answered if empirical social scientists are to extend their focus 
to the justificatory practices of judges. And I can only offer some 
speculation about this question in the remaining space here. 
Regarding a potential measure of the substantive content of law, 
there must be a way to array, preferably on a couple of dimensions, 
the set of rules and principles that could be the substantive basis for a 
particular area of the law. This is a formidable task. Potential sources 
for such a measure, however, can be found in the existing social 
science literature. One might look to the case-space framework 
recently employed by formal theorists to begin to conceptualize ways 
of developing this measure. This approach has real analytical 
promise, but claims that the framework has important methodological 
implications for empirical studies have yet to be supported. 
Another potential source might be the impressive efforts to 
enhance measures of judicial ideology. For example, Professors 
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Epstein, Martin, Segal and Westerland recently used the Martin-
Quinn approach to judicial ideology to analyze the trends of 
individual Justices’ votes over time.51 One way to develop a measure 
of the feasible set of alternatives in a particular substantive area of 
the law might be to adopt a similar methodological strategy. Various 
judges’ decisions could be collected in a common legal area over time 
and reinterpreted as plausible alternatives in the feasible set of 
substantive positions on that legal question. 
Regarding the measures I have been calling the sources of law, 
the task is to find a way to develop indicators of these various sources. 
These factors form the basis for the reasons and justifications that 
judges apply in their opinions. A partial sample of the available 
theories of judicial interpretation can help to develop a substantial list 
of possibilities. They may include, but are not limited to, precedents, 
constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative regulations, 
legislative history, generally accepted social practices (for example, in 
the commercial law area), social norms, and basic values on which 
there is a social consensus in the community. 
Focusing on how this wide variety of sources can be converted 
into data that might lead to the identification of general causal 
mechanisms allows them to be translated into a workable social 
scientific analysis. Here, I propose that the best way to do this would 
be to establish a set of categories of different types of sources and 
then seek to establish generalizable claims about the conditions under 
which judges are more or less likely to invoke a particular category. 
So, the focus would not be on the particular details of a specific 
argument, but rather on how the argument fits into a general 
framework of source categories. The primary interest of the social 
scientist will be how different categories of factors affect the 
evolution of the law or how the different categories affect the 
acceptance of the claims of legitimacy. 
This focus on categories and conditions highlights the 
comparative advantage of empirical social scientists. For explanations 
of the substantive content of law, social scientists are better equipped 
to establish and document the general causal framework in which 
judges change and justify the law. Their comparative advantage is not 
the detailed analysis of the substantive path of the law in particular 
areas. But in pursuing their comparative advantage, empirical social 
 
 51. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 309–21 
(2007). 
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scientists have a significant contribution to make to these more 
detailed analyses. 
I will end with this last point on how social science research can 
support and enhance the efforts of legal scholars both to understand 
and to normatively assess the behavior of judges. Most studies of the 
development of law in particular substantive areas make important 
assumptions, often implicit and unstated, about the causal structure of 
law. Similarly, they commonly invoke, without substantiation, various 
causal mechanisms to further their explanatory narrative. There is 
nothing, in principle, wrong with this. In fact, reliance on some kind 
of general causal framework is a necessary feature of these accounts. 
And this is when social scientific research enters the picture. To the 
extent that the social scientific framework is found persuasive by the 
intellectual community at large, it will serve as both a guide and a 
constraint for how other scholars make these assumptions and 
employ these causal mechanisms. In particular, these scholars will be 
under some obligation to reconcile their accounts with the best 
understanding of how these general mechanisms actually work. In this 
way, the social scientific study of courts can have a significant 
influence on the scholarly understanding of what judges do and the 
assessment of how well they do it. 
